Envíe este artículo por correo electrónico Agentes y estructuras: dos visiones de las preferencias, dos visiones de las instituciones
Resumen
Dos enfoques analíticos distintos para el estudio de la política doméstica
han sido referidos como el nuevo institucionalismo. La diferencia
fundamental entre las dos ramas del institucionalismo puede ser vista
en la manera en que se ocupan de la relación entre agentes y estructuras.
El enfoque basado en estructuras se orienta hacia las instituciones,
dándole primacía ontológica a las estructuras y mira a los agentes como
constituidos por ellas. La perspectiva centrada en agencias visualiza a
los agentes humanos como ontológicamente primitivos y concibe a las
instituciones como estructuras que son creadas por individuos maximizadores.
Los dos enfoques son comparados dando especial atención
a la forma en que tratan las preferencias que tienen los actores. Se
argumenta que contrariamente a las posturas de muchos de los teóricos
basados en estructuras, el enfoque centrado en agencias es capaz de
contribuir a la discusión respecto a los recursos de las preferencias del
actor. Un modelo de información limitada de la interacción estratégica
entre trabajadores y capitalistas es usado aquí para demostrar las formas
en las cuales el enfoque centrado en agencias puede comenzar a
convertir las preferencias en endógenas.
Palabras clave
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